The voter and aid
It might be argued that there is an ordinary political reason for Tony Blair's interest in Africa, and for his endorsement of Make Poverty History's sort of argument. He might believe that the campaigners do not so much wield virtue or wisdom, as hold the key to millions of votes. Opinion polls would not support this contention: the Daily Telegraph has reported that a very high percentage of Britons believe much aid is wasted. [[7]] This is a traditional sort of result, and one might wonder if the scepticism over aid is a cover for public meanness. Mr Blair ought to admit that the prejudices of his voters lag well behind his messianic aspirations. More important, he ought to have said to the Live8 audiences, and to those millions who texted their support for Live8: "Before you can make poverty history, you have to make it political. Persuade your fans to join parties and vote. Even if you do, I fear you will be outvoted by the sceptical. But that's the democratic way."

The aid sceptic may indeed be able to take comfort from an emerging sense that the aid campaigners have overplayed their hand. Their G8 triumphalism produced a good deal of commentary challenging both the platform of the British aid campaigners, and the Blair/Brown approach to selling it to the Americans. It may even have gone down badly - not least with the rest of the G8 leaders - that Bono and Geldof were overtly presented as the gatekeepers of Gleneagles. It was these celebrities who were shown giving press conferences from the very scene of the G8 conference. Surely it must have struck viewers as odd that it was the judgement of these singers - and not the judgements of the UN, of democratically elected politicians - that were foregrounded by Mr Blair?

In short, this branch of Mr Blair's Messiah Politics may become positively unpopular, even with his successors. If it really was a ploy - perhaps one designed as a counterweight to his militarism - it may fail. If it was genuinely felt, Mr Blair may be given the chance to prove that he is serious about it: he may have to defend his newfound enthusiasm for leftish campaigning to openly sceptical audiences. This may especially become the case if he retires from politics and gets into saving the world in a serious way.

Saving the World 2: Global Warming

More snake-oil
The July 2005 G8 meeting's response to what was billed as the second big issue of concern was probably ideal for Mr Blair as a snake-oil Messiah politician. In 2004 he had been full of passion on climate change. In 2005, he almost glowed with his newfound realism. He changed gear and portrayed himself as someone who had tried, and failed, almost as though he had been heroic. That's life with Messiah Politics, and either version plays well.

Now, in 2007, we are beginning to see what the successors to Blair are going to make of the issue. The truth is probably that they will find as little serious room for manoeuvre as he did.

Back in 2005, in Gleneagles, Tony Blair was able to say that he had worked to bring Mr Bush into line with climate change alarmism, and had wrung a bit of language from the president about the human involvement in global warming. That Mr Bush had not become any great fan of limits on greenhouse gas emissions had to be glossed over, as indeed did the failure of the entire world to do very much on the subject. As with Africa, G8 was a high point in Blair's mission to save the world, but also marked a new phase: the world-weary statesman admitting his failure.

Mr Blair's own inability to deliver much of a British response to the problem became clearer as 2006 wore on. UK emissions of greenhouse gases in general are flat and those of carbon dioxide are slightly rising. In snake oil messiah mode, Tony Blair had promised they would fall substantially (and still by nothing like enough to show green virtue). In particular, in October 2006, the publication of the Stern review of the economics of dealing with climate change produced a torrent of media coverage. [Link]The Independent and other like-minded activists thought it was the report which would change everything. But the other side were also emboldened by the report, which occasioned probably the first serious wave of analysis as to what actions were politically possible (globally or locally) and what benefit to the world's climate they might bring, if any. The process had already begun, with the 2005 publication of a House of Lords economic committee report which cast doubt on the idea that action to "control" the climate could be easy or certainly effective. [Link]